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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in an era of
legislative reform to bolster the United States’ ability to prepare for and
respond to public health emergencies, including pandemics and acts of
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bioterrorism. As part of its post-9/11 response, Congress enacted broad
liability protections for, among others, manufacturers of medical
countermeasures, along with a corresponding no-fault compensation
program for individuals injured by such countermeasures. During
public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, these liability
protections play a critical role in encouraging the development and use
of medical countermeasures. The no-fault compensation program,
however, leaves much to be desired by individuals harmed by
countermeasures. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportune
time to take a fresh look at the compensation program and to consider
needed reforms. After describing the liability protections and the
corresponding compensation program, this Article unpacks the
compensation program’s deficiencies and proposes reforms that
recognize that liability protections must go hand-in-hand with a robust
no-fault injury compensation program.
INTRODUCTION
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States and the coinciding delivery of anthrax through the U.S. mail,1
Congress passed several laws to strengthen the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies involving chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents, including emerging infectious diseases.2 Nearly one dozen laws fell within this congressional effort. These laws amended provisions of the Public Health
Service Act (PHSA)3 and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).4 They included, among others, the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,5 the Project BioShield Act of 2004,6 the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREP Act),7 the Pandemic and All-Hazards
1. These two events appear to be unrelated. See S. REP. NO. 107-351 & H. REP. NO. 107-792,
at 394 (J. Rep. 2002) (“To date, no connection has been established between the anthrax attacks
and the terrorist attacks of September 11.”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATIVE
SUMMARY 1 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/archive/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-summary2.pdf (concluding that Dr. Bruce E. Ivins of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases acted alone in mailing the anthrax letters).
2. See MCM-Related Counterterrorism Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2,
2021), https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-andpolicy-framework/mcm-related-counterterrorism-legislation; see also infra notes 5–12.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2022).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2022).
5. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
6. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
7. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2818 (2005).
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Preparedness Act,8 the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Reauthorization Act of 2013,9 various provisions of the 21st Century
Cures Act,10 Public Law 115-92,11 and the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019.12
Among these laws, the PREP Act sought to address liability concerns raised by the research, development, manufacture, distribution,
and use of medical countermeasures against pathogens that may give
rise to epidemics or pandemics, such as COVID-19, or that may be
used as CBRN agents, such as anthrax. The PREP Act provides certain “covered persons” with broad immunity from federal and state
claims for losses relating to specified “covered countermeasures” administered or used during a public health emergency.13 Liability protections represent a critical component of public health preparedness
and response efforts, as they help encourage the development and use
of medical countermeasures prior to and during public health emergencies.14 Yet, there are tradeoffs.
For example, with few exceptions, individuals who believe they
have been injured by a covered countermeasure cannot seek recourse
by filing suit against a covered person. Instead, they must seek compensation through the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP), a no-fault compensation program available to eligible
individuals who suffer serious physical injuries or death directly
caused by the administration or use of a covered countermeasure. Serious medical, legal, and social concerns have surfaced as a result,
given the CICP’s numerous inadequacies.
This Article addresses the tort law gap in an age of pandemic and
bioterrorism threats. It proceeds with a narrow scope. That is, even
though the PREP Act can apply to claims related to a broad array of
8. Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006).
9. Pub. L. No. 113-5, 127 Stat. 161 (2013).
10. Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3081–88, 130 Stat. 1033, 1140–49 (2016).
11. Pub. L. No. 115-92, 131 Stat. 2023 (2017).
12. Pub. L. No. 116-22, 133 Stat. 905 (2019).
13. Important terms are defined in Part I.A.
14. As stated by then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, co-sponsor of the bill that included
the PREP Act:
The real and imminent dangers posed by diseases like avian influenza underscore the
serious need to bolster America’s preparedness by enacting meaningful liability reform.
These sensible and measured reforms will encourage manufacturers, distributors, and
first responders to keep Americans safe once disaster strikes. The bill strikes a reasonable balance where those who are harmed will be fairly compensated and life-saving
products will be available in ample supply to protect and treat as many Americans as
possible.
B. Kurt Copper, “High and Dry?” The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and
Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, J. HEALTH L., Winter 2007, at 65, 67–68.
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covered countermeasures and covered persons, this Article centers on
the liability protections provided to manufacturers of therapeutics and
vaccines. As an important case study, it focuses particularly on vaccines, given the vast number of individuals who have received or will
receive a COVID-19 vaccine and thus potentially make claims for
compensation through the CICP for injuries related to COVID-19
vaccines. Importantly, however, this Article does not lose sight of the
need to provide an adequate compensation system for individuals injured by all covered countermeasures.
Two important points ground this Article. First, the immunity protections provided by the PREP Act serve an important purpose during public health emergencies and should be retained. Second, the
safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics available
in the United States are supported by ongoing studies and robust postauthorization monitoring. This Article recognizes, however, that no
medical product is one-hundred percent safe. The problems with the
PREP Act stem not from the breadth of its liability protections, but
rather its inadequate compensation program that lacks transparency
and is likely unprepared to handle a public health emergency of
COVID-19’s magnitude.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the PREP Act
and related concepts, including a brief overview of Emergency Use
Authorizations (EUAs) and the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration.15
Part II highlights PREP Act case law, both prior to and during the
COVID-19 pandemic.16 Part III turns to the CICP, examining its
scope and limitations and comparing it to another no-fault compensation program, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
(VICP).17 Part IV discusses the importance of a more robust and
transparent compensation program and proposes reforms to address
the CICP’s limitations.18 The Article concludes by urging further discussion and consideration of legislative and policy changes to ensure
that those injured by covered countermeasures receive adequate compensation through a fair, transparent, and accessible process.19

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

Part I.
Part II.
Part III.
Part IV.
Conclusion.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL214.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 5

INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM
I. THE PREP ACT: THEN

AND

6-JUN-22

12:51

693

NOW

This Part opens with a descriptive account of the PREP Act.20 It
unpacks the essential elements of the law that lay the foundation for
the analysis and normative conclusions developed in this Article. It
then turns to the current COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration to describe the scope of the protections provided by that Declaration and
its amendments.
A. The PREP Act
Congress enacted the PREP Act in 2005 to address liability concerns raised by the research, development, manufacture, distribution,
and use of medical countermeasures against pathogens that can give
rise to epidemics or pandemics, such as COVID-19, or that may be
used as CBRN agents, such as anthrax.21 The PREP Act encourages
the expeditious development and deployment of certain “covered
countermeasures” (e.g., diagnostics, devices, therapeutics, and vaccines) during a public health emergency by limiting legal liability for
losses relating to the use or administration of such products.22 The
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) (the Secretary) must first make a determination that a disease
or other threat to health constitutes a public health emergency or a
credible risk of such emergency.23 Following such determination, the
PREP Act authorizes the Secretary to issue a PREP Act declaration
that provides certain “covered persons” with immunity from suit and
liability under federal and state law for “all claims for loss caused by,
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or
use by an individual of” a covered countermeasure.24
The following terms are important for understanding the PREP Act
and its scope:
20. For additional background on the lead-up to the PREP Act, see Lincoln Mayer, Immunity
for Immunizations: Tort Liability, Biodefense, and Bioshield II, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1753, 1757–61
(2007).
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING UPDATE: A REPORT
SECRETARY MICHAEL O. LEAVITT 6 (2006) (“The threat of liability has been a major
obstacle to developing a strong domestic vaccine industry. . . . As a result, Congress adopted
legislation (PREP Act) providing industry with limited liability when meeting a declared public
health emergency.”).
FROM

22. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2020).
23. Id. § 247d-6d(b).
24. Id. § 247d-6d(a).
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• “Covered countermeasure”25 has a complex statutory definition,
but it is essentially a drug, biologic (including vaccines), device,
or diagnostic used to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent, or mitigate a
pandemic/epidemic or threat to public health (or “limit the harm
such pandemic or epidemic might otherwise cause”26) that is:
(1) approved, licensed, or cleared under the FDCA or PHSA;
(2) authorized for investigational use; or (3) authorized for
emergency use.27 It also includes certain respiratory protective
devices approved by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health that the Secretary has determined to be a priority for use during a declared public health emergency.28
• A “covered person” includes the United States; manufacturers,
distributors, and program planners29 of covered countermeasures; qualified persons (defined below) who prescribe, administer, or dispense covered countermeasures; and officials, agents,
or employees of any of the previously listed persons.30
• “Qualified persons,” with respect to the administration or use of
a covered countermeasure, include (1) licensed health profes25. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1); see also id. § 247d-6d(i)(7) (defining “qualified pandemic or epidemic
product”); see also id. § 247d-6b(c)(1)(B) (defining “security countermeasure”). In addition to
falling under one of the enumerated categories, a declaration must be issued with respect to the
countermeasure. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
26. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(A)(II).
27. This includes products authorized under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) pursuant to section 564 of the FDCA, described in Emergency Use Instructions (EUIs) issued by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) pursuant to section 564A of the FDCA, or
held for emergency use pursuant to section 564B of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360bbb-3–360bbb3b (2019).
28. Section 3103 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
amended the PREP Act to add this category of respiratory protective devices to the definition of
covered countermeasure. Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3103, 134 Stat. 281, 361 (2020) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(D) (2020)).
29. Program planners include state/local governments, Native American tribes, or other persons who supervise/administer programs. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(6). Such programs include those
relating to the administration, dispensing, distribution, provision, or use of a countermeasure,
including “a person who has established requirements, provided policy guidance, or supplied
technical or scientific advice or assistance or provides a facility to administer or use a covered
countermeasure in accordance with a [PREP Act declaration].” Id. HHS adopted a broad interpretation of the term “program planner” for purposes of the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVISORY OPINION 20-04 ON THE PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT AND THE SECRETARY’S DECLARATION UNDER THE
ACT 2–3 (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/advisory-opinion-20-04-hhs-ogc-publicreadiness-emergency-preparedness-act.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY OPINION NO. 20-04] (“[A]ny
individual or organization can potentially be a program planner and receive PREP Act coverage
. . . [including] private businesses, public and private transportation providers, public and private
schools, and religious organizations are all eligible for PREP Act coverage when they act in
accordance with the PREP Act and the Declaration.”).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2).
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sionals or other individuals authorized to prescribe, administer,
or dispense covered countermeasures under applicable state
law; or (2) other categories of persons identified by the Secretary in a PREP Act declaration.31
• A “loss” means “any type of loss,” including: (1) death; (2) physical, mental, or emotional injury, illness, disability, or condition
(or fear thereof32); and (3) loss or damage to property, including
business interruption loss.33 At a minimum, this definition appears to include most state tort law, medical malpractice, and
wrongful death claims arising from the use or administration of
covered countermeasures.
The Secretary must define the scope of protections afforded by each
PREP Act declaration, including the covered countermeasures, geographic areas, subject populations, time periods, and means of distribution covered by the declaration. Since the PREP Act’s enactment in
2005, PREP Act declarations have been issued to cover countermeasures for smallpox, botulinum toxin, acute radiation syndrome, anthrax, pandemic influenza, Zika, nerve agents and insecticides, Ebola,
Marburgvirus and Marburg Disease, and COVID-19.34
The PREP Act permits covered persons to assert immunity from
suit rather than litigate entitlement to reimbursement, as may be required under other forms of liability protection.35 The immunity provided has been described by scholars and courts as “potent,”36
“unprecedented,”37 and “sweeping.”38 Indeed, it applies to:
Any claim for loss that has a causal relationship with the administration to or use by an individual of a covered countermeasure, including a causal relationship with the design, development, clinical
testing or investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formula31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 247d-6d(i)(8).
This includes fear of “any need for medical monitoring.” Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2).
Id.
See Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://aspr.hhs.gov/legal/PREPact/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (listing
PREP Act declarations).
35. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.250-1 (2007) (providing for insurance or indemnification under Pub. L.
No. 85-804 for unusually hazardous risks).
36. Mayer, supra note 20, at 1762.
37. Samuel C. Bauer, Ebola and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act: Defining the Outer Boundaries of Unreviewable Administrative Action, 8 NE. U. L.J. 223, 228
(2016); Angela Marino, The Cost of a Countermeasure: The Expansive Liability Protection of the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199,
200 (2009).
38. Parker v. St. Lawrence Cty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 954 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (App. Div. 2012);
see also Bauer, supra note 37, at 231 (referring to the PREP Act’s liability protections as
“expansive”).
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tion, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of such
countermeasure.39

The PREP Act also includes a broad preemption provision, which
preempts state laws that are different from or that conflict with the
PREP Act.40
Despite its breadth, the PREP Act includes limitations—even while
the law may not go far enough in protecting and compensating
harmed individuals. First, it does not provide immunity for death or
serious physical injury caused by willful misconduct.41 This exception,
however, establishes a difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet,42 and
the process for filing suit and proving willful misconduct is limited in
several ways.
For example, to recover under the willful misconduct standard, an
individual must first seek compensation through the CICP.43 The
harmed person(s) cannot sue if they choose to be compensated
through the CICP.44 If a suit is filed, the standards are difficult to
39. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(8). The preemption provision provides as follows:
During the effective period of a declaration . . . or at any time with respect to conduct
undertaken in accordance with such declaration, no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish, enforce, or continue in effect with respect to a covered countermeasure any provision of law or legal requirement that—(A) is different from, or is in
conflict with, any requirement applicable under this section; and (B) relates to the design, development, clinical testing or investigation, formulation, manufacture, distribution, sale, donation, purchase, marketing, promotion, packaging, labeling, licensing,
use, any other aspect of safety or efficacy, or the prescribing, dispensing, or administration by qualified persons of the covered countermeasure, or to any matter included in a
requirement applicable to the covered countermeasure under this section or any other
provision of this chapter, or under the [FDCA].
Id.
41. Id. § 247d-6d(d). The PREP Act defines “willful misconduct” as “an act or omission that is
taken—(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual
justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly
probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit.” Id. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A). The law further states
that the criteria for establishing willful misconduct “shall be construed as establishing a standard
for liability that is more stringent than a standard of negligence in any form or recklessness.” Id.
§ 247d-6d(c)(1)(B).
42. See, e.g., Copper, supra note 14, at 88 n.123 (“Even if one were able to produce proof of
possible willful misconduct on the part of drug companies, a near impossibility, the procedural
hurdles of the act would make the cause of action exceedingly difficult to bring.”); Mary S.
Holland, Liability for Vaccine Injury: The United States, the European Union, and the Developing
World, 67 EMORY L. J. 415, 449 (2018) (describing the requirements to establish willful misconduct as “almost insurmountable hurdles to justiciability”); Robert Church et al., COVID-19:
Daily Report for Life Sciences and Health Care Companies, JD SUPRA (Mar. 25, 2020), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/covid-19-daily-report-for-life-sciences-22095/ (describing the willful
misconduct standard under the PREP Act as a “high bar”).
43. See infra Part III; 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d)(1).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d)(5).
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meet. The suit must be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia,45 and a plaintiff must prove willful misconduct by “clear
and convincing evidence,”46 a higher standard than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard typically used in civil court.47 Such
standards very likely enable covered persons to avoid some lawsuits.48
Furthermore, manufacturers and distributors can defend against such
claims if the activity is regulated under the PHSA or FDCA and if
(1) the Secretary or Attorney General has not initiated an enforcement action with respect to the activity; or (2) any such enforcement
action was terminated or finally resolved without a “covered remedy,”
such as a conviction, injunction, monetary penalty, recall, or revocation of an EUA and/or approval/clearance.49
In addition to the exception for willful misconduct, the PREP Act
“does not provide immunity against federal enforcement actions
brought by the federal government—civil, criminal, or administrative.
Nor does the PREP Act provide immunity against suit and liability for
claims under federal law for equitable relief.”50 The PREP Act also
does not apply to claims brought in non-U.S. tribunals or under nonU.S. law.51 Further, although the Secretary cannot retroactively limit
protections provided to covered countermeasures that are used prior
to the amendment or withdrawal of a declaration, countermeasures
that are distributed while a declaration remains in effect are at risk of
losing protection in the event the Secretary amends or withdraws a
declaration after their distribution but before their use.52 Lastly,
PREP Act declarations frequently limit the potential scope of protection by covering the administration or use of covered countermeasures only when they are distributed in connection with a federal
contract, grant, or other agreement.53
45. Id. § 247d-6d(e)(1).
46. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(3). Additionally, the plaintiff must plead each element with particularity,
and the complaint must be verified and supported by certified medical records and an affidavit
from a physician who did not treat the patient. Id. § 247d-6d(e).
47. See id. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (1992); Holland, supra note 42, at 449.
48. A letter from Senator Ted Kennedy and twenty colleagues to the Speaker of the House
and majority leader urged the repeal of the PREP Act, arguing that it could “be used to allow
manufacturers of virtually any drug or vaccine to escape responsibility for gross negligence or
even criminal acts.” Holland, supra note 42, at 449–50 (quoting Sen. Kennedy’s letter).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(A), (B)(ii).
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVISORY OPINION ON THE PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT AND THE MARCH 10, 2020 DECLARATION UNDER
THE ACT 2 (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/prep-act-advisory-opinion-hhs-ogc.pdf.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)–(e).
52. See id. § 247d-6d(a)(3)(A), (b)(4).
53. See, e.g., Ebola Virus Disease Vaccines–Amendment, 84 Fed. Reg. 764, 766 (Jan. 31, 2019).
A relevant provision in the PREP Act declaration for Ebola, for example, states:
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B. Emergency Use Authorizations
To understand the PREP Act, EUAs must be explained. Section
564 of the FDCA provides the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) the authority to authorize the use of an unapproved medical
product (e.g., drug, biologic (including vaccines), device, or diagnostic) or an unapproved use of an approved medical product in the context of a public health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic.54
The FDA may issue an EUA following a determination of a particular
type of threat or public health emergency. The types of emergencies
that trigger these authorities include (1) public health emergencies announced by the Secretary of HHS; (2) military emergencies announced by the Secretary of Defense; (3) domestic emergencies
announced by the Secretary of Homeland Security; and (4) the identification of a “material threat” pursuant to section 319F-2 of the PHSA
that is sufficient to affect national security or the health and security
of U.S. citizens living abroad.55
Following such a determination, the Secretary of HHS can make a
declaration that the circumstances exist to justify an EUA.56 During
the effective period of the Secretary’s declaration, the FDA may then
issue EUAs for products intended for use during that period to address the actual or potential threat. The FDA may issue an EUA only
if the following criteria are met:57
1. The CBRN agent(s) referred to in the Secretary’s EUA declaration (e.g., SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19) is capable of causing a serious or life-threatening disease or
condition;
2. Based on the totality of scientific evidence available, it is reasonable to believe that (a) the product “may be effective” in
[L]iability immunity is afforded to Covered Persons for Recommended Activities involving Covered Countermeasures that are directly supported by the U.S. Federal Government through past, present or future federal contracts, cooperative agreements,
grants, other transactions, interagency agreements, or memoranda of understanding or
other federal agreements or arrangements. The Secretary specifies that the term “directly supported” in this Declaration means that the U.S. has provided some form of
tangible support such as supplies, funds, products, technical assistance, or staffing.
Id.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3.
55. Id. § 360bbb-3(b).
56. Id. § 360bbb-3(b)(1). A determination under section 319 or section 319F-3 of the PHSA
does not enable the FDA to issue EUAs. Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-andpolicy-framework/emergency-use-authorization (last visited Mar. 2, 2022). The determination
must be made pursuant to section 564 of FDCA. Id.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c).
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preventing, diagnosing, or treating the disease or condition
caused by the pathogen (e.g., COVID-19) and (b) the known
and potential benefits of the product, when used to prevent, diagnose, or treat the disease or condition, outweigh the known
and potential risks of the product; and
3. There are “no adequate, approved, and available” alternatives
to the emergency use of the product.
Importantly, an EUA does not represent a full approval or license.
Rather, it provides an authorization to distribute and use the product,
subject to the terms and conditions of the EUA, during the effective
period of the Secretary’s declaration.
On February 4, 2020, then-Secretary Alex Azar determined, pursuant to section 564 of the FDCA, that a public health emergency existed involving COVID-19.58 The Secretary subsequently issued
declarations that the circumstances existed justifying EUAs for particular types of medical products for COVID-19, including in vitro diagnostics,59 medical devices,60 and drugs and biologics (including
vaccines).61 In turn, the FDA issued a number of EUAs for COVID19 vaccines, therapeutics, devices, and diagnostics.62 Each of these
EUA products represents a covered countermeasure for purposes of
the PREP Act.
C. COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration
Secretary Azar first issued a PREP Act declaration for COVID-19
(COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration) on March 10, 2020, with an effective date of February 4, 2020, through October 1, 2024 (plus an additional twelve months for disposition of covered countermeasures).63
Under the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration, a covered countermeasure includes “any antiviral, any other drug, any biologic, any diagnostic, any other device, or any vaccine, used to treat, diagnose, cure,
prevent, or mitigate COVID-19.”64
58. Determination of Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7316, 7316 (Feb. 7, 2020).
59. Id. at 7316–17.
60. Emergency Use Authorization Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,335, 17,336 (Mar. 27, 2020).
61. Emergency Use Authorization Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,250, 18,250 (Apr. 1, 2020).
62. See Emergency Use Authorization, supra note 56 (compiling COVID-19 and other current
EUAs).
63. Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198, 15,202 (Mar. 17, 2020).
64. Id.
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The Secretary amended the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration multiple times to expand the scope of immunity.65 Among other things,
these amendments broadened the definition of “covered countermeasures” under the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration;66 added additional categories of qualified persons authorized to prescribe,
dispense, and administer covered countermeasures;67 provided immunity for not administering a covered countermeasure in certain situations;68 and added a method of distribution to provide liability
65. As of March 4, 2022, the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration has been amended ten times.
See Tenth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 87 Fed. Reg. 982 (Jan. 7, 2022);
Ninth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 51,160 (Sept. 14, 2021);
Eighth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 41,977 (Aug. 4, 2021); Seventh Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,462 (Mar. 16, 2021); Sixth
Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for
Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 9516 (Feb. 16, 2021); Fifth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 7872 (Feb. 2, 2021); Fourth Amendment to
Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,190 (Dec. 9, 2020); Third Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,136 (Aug. 24, 2020); Second Amendment
to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 35,100 (June 8, 2020); Amendment to Declaration
Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures
Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 21,012 (Apr. 15, 2020). For a brief description of most of the
amendments, see KEVIN J. HICKEY, THE PREP ACT AND COVID-19: LIMITING LIABILITY FOR
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 5 (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/
LSB10443.
66. See Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. at 21,014.
67. See Ninth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 51,161;
Eighth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 41,978; Seventh Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 14,463–64; Sixth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 9517–19; Fifth Amendment to Declaration Under the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against
COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7873.
68. Fourth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,197
(“Prioritization or purposeful allocation of a Covered Countermeasure [which may result in use
of a Covered Countermeasure for one individual over another], particularly if done in accordance with a public health authority’s directive, can fall within the PREP Act and this Declaration’s liability protections.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVISORY
OPINION NO. 21-01 ON THE PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT SCOPE OF
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protections for private distribution channels.69 Many of the later
amendments continued to expand the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration in an effort to facilitate vaccination efforts.70
II.

PREP ACT CASE LAW

There is limited case law addressing the merits of a PREP Act immunity defense based on the use of a covered countermeasure, particularly with respect to claims against manufacturers of covered
countermeasures. Most cases, both prior to and during the COVID-19
pandemic, involved claims against healthcare providers and healthcare facilities. This Part highlights some of those cases.
A. Pre-COVID-19 Case Law
Prior to COVID-19, three primary PREP Act cases included Kehler
v. Hood,71 Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health Department,72
and Casabianca v. Mount Sinai Medical Center.73 Of these, Kehler is
the only case involving a manufacturer of a covered countermeasure.
In Kehler, Larry and Ann Kehler filed suit against a healthcare provider and hospital for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering the H1N1 vaccine to Mr. Kehler, which the plaintiffs
alleged resulted in an injury to Mr. Kehler.74 The defendants thereafter brought third-party product liability claims against the manufacturer of the vaccine.75 The federal district court concluded that the
PREP Act barred the claim against the manufacturer, stating:
The parties do not dispute that third party defendant . . . the alleged
manufacturer of the H1N1 vaccine at issue here, is protected by the
PREP Act and is absolutely immune from liability for any type of
PREEMPTION PROVISION 3–4 (2021), https://www.hhs.gov/guidance/sites/default/files/hhs-guidance-documents/2101081078-jo-advisory-opinion-prep-act-complete-preemption-01-08-2021-final-hhs-web.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY OPINION NO. 21-01].
69. See Fourth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,194.
70. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Biden Administration
Takes Action Through HHS to Increase Number of Vaccinators (Mar. 12, 2021), https://
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/03/12/biden-administration-takes-action-through-hhs-increasenumber-vaccinators.html (“As part of President Biden’s national strategy to defeat the pandemic . . . HHS has used its authority under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act (PREP Act) to add additional categories of qualified people authorized to prescribe, dispense, and administer COVID-19 vaccines.”).
71. Kehler v. Hood, No. 4:11CV1416, 2012 WL 1945952 (E.D. Mo. May 30, 2012).
72. Parker v. St. Lawrence Cty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 954 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2012).
73. Casabianca v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 112790/10, 2014 WL 10413521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
2, 2014).
74. Kehler, 2012 WL 1945952, at *1.
75. Id.
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loss caused by the vaccine. Further, no injured party here has alleged that [the manufacturer] engaged in willful misconduct so as to
bring its claim within the statute’s only recognized exception to
immunity.76

The state law claims against the healthcare provider and hospital
were remanded to state court, and the district court did not rule on
whether the PREP Act’s immunity defense was applicable to the state
law claims brought against the healthcare provider and hospital.77
In Parker, the plaintiffs sued the county health department, alleging
that the administration of the H1N1 vaccine to their daughter without
their consent constituted negligence and resulted in a battery upon
their daughter.78 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law negligence and battery claims, concluding that the state law claims were “preempted by the PREP Act
and, inasmuch as the exclusive remedy under the statute is a federal
cause of action to be brought in federal court, the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”79 The court noted
the PREP Act’s broad preemption clause and its “sweeping” immunity provision, concluding that “Congress intended to preempt all
state law tort claims arising from the administration of covered countermeasures by a qualified person pursuant to a declaration by the
Secretary, including one based upon a defendant’s failure to obtain
consent.”80
A third case, Casabianca, did not involve the use or administration
of a covered countermeasure under the PREP Act.81 Rather, the
plaintiff alleged malpractice for failure to administer a covered countermeasure—the H1N1 vaccine—a failure alleged to have caused the
death of the plaintiff’s husband.82 The New York Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that malpractice
claims arising from the failure to administer a covered countermea76. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at *4. Essentially, the court appeared to treat the state medical negligence claims as
based on the healthcare provider’s and hospital’s actions prior to the administration of the vaccine and thus not actually “relating to” the administration of the vaccine, which could bring it
under the PREP Act. See id. “Plaintiffs raise State law claims of medical negligence based on the
conduct of defendants Dr. Hood and St. Luke’s which occurred prior to the administration of the
H1N1 vaccine.” Id.
78. Parker v. St. Lawrence Cty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 954 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (App. Div. 2012).
79. Id. at 263.
80. Id. at 262.
81. Casabianca v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 112790/10, 2014 WL 10413521, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 2, 2014).
82. Id. at *1.
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sure vaccine were outside the scope of the PREP Act’s immunity provisions for the H1N1 vaccine.83
In its decision, the court noted that the vaccine was in short supply
and that the hospital was selectively administering it to high-risk patients in accordance with guidelines from states and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).84 The decedent did not meet
the eligibility criteria and therefore was not administered the vaccine.85 Given the facts of Casabianca, it is not clear whether such a
claim could be pursued under the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration.
As noted above, the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration was amended
to clarify that the PREP Act may provide immunity for failing to administer a covered countermeasure, when such failure results from
prioritizing or purposefully allocating a covered countermeasure in
limited supply, “particularly if done in accordance with a public health
authority’s directive,” such as the CDC, which was the case in
Casabianca.86
B. COVID-19 Case Law
In the context of COVID-19, most publicly available court decisions
citing the PREP Act as of February 2022 involved nursing homes/
long-term care facilities.87 Many were filed initially in state courts and
typically alleged claims such as medical malpractice and wrongful
death arising from the facilities’ failures to take appropriate actions
and follow certain policies, procedures, and guidelines to prevent the
83. Id. at *4–5.
84. Id. at *1.
85. Id.
86. Fourth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,190, 79,197
(Dec. 9, 2020). An advisory opinion issued by the HHS Office of General Counsel on January 8,
2021, affirmed that the PREP Act may apply in such a situation, as the failure to use the countermeasure would “relate to” the administration of a covered countermeasure to another person
because that other person “was able to receive the [covered countermeasure] only because it was
not administered to the [other person].” ADVISORY OPINION NO. 21-01, supra note 68, at 3. “In
contrast, the failure to purchase any PPE [personal protective equipment], if not the outcome of
some form of decision-making process may not be sufficient to trigger the PREP Act.” Id. (emphasis added).
87. But see, e.g., Tonkinson v. Walmart, Inc., No. 21-2588, 2022 WL 425868, at *1 (D. Kan.
Feb. 11, 2022) (alleging, inter alia, “that Walmart made material misstatements of fact and law to
obtain signatures and induce [a minor] to be ‘vaccine injected without parental consent, and to
conspire with [the minor] to keep what Walmart had done to [the minor] a secret’ ”); Ruiz v.
ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, No. 21-CV-387, 2021 WL 3056275, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July
20, 2021) (alleging that plaintiff contracted COVID-19 while working at ConAgra under unsafe
working conditions and that plaintiff transmitted the disease to his wife, who died).
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spread of COVID-19 among the facilities’ residents.88 That is, they
typically did not allege an injury relating to the use or administration
of a covered countermeasure or bring claims against a manufacturer
of a covered countermeasure.
At least one case, brought against the owners of a senior living community, involved claims relating to the use of hydroxychloroquine sulfate, which was authorized for emergency use at the time it was used.89
The suit was filed after Anne Jean Cannon, a resident of the senior
living community diagnosed with COVID-19, died after receiving the
treatment.90 When Ms. Cannon received the drug, the hydroxychloroquine EUA applied only to the treatment of adults and adolescent
patients hospitalized with COVID-19.91 The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that hydroxychloroquine was a covered countermeasure, and thus its use to treat Ms. Cannon was covered by the
PREP Act.92 The court denied the motion because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs alleged that the drug was used to treat Ms. Cannon
at the senior living community, rather than in a hospital setting as required by the terms of the EUA.93 The court stated:
Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, as this Court must at this
motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings, Defendants’ administration of hydroxychloroquine sulfate does not fall within the clear,
88. See, e.g., Baskin v. Big Blue Healthcare, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-2267, 2020 WL 4815074, at *1
(D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2020) (holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanding
to state court after concluding that the PREP Act does not apply to claims alleging negligence
for failure to follow certain policies, procedures, and guidelines regarding COVID-19); Estate of
Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr. I, 478 F. Supp. 3d 518, 531 (D. N.J. 2020) (concluding,
inter alia, that the action could not be removed to federal court under the PREP Act because
state claims relating to the failure to use countermeasures fall outside the PREP Act, “which is
designed to protect those who employ countermeasures [e.g., PPE], not those who decline to
employ them”). Because some of these cases were filed and decided prior to the Fourth Amendment to the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration in December 2020, which made clear that the
PREP Act can apply to the failure to administer a covered countermeasure when such failure is
the result of prioritizing or purposefully allocating a covered countermeasure that is in limited
supply, it is not clear whether the courts would reach the same conclusions in all of these cases.
See Fourth Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,197.
89. The FDA issued an EUA for hydroxychloroquine sulfate and chloroquine phosphate on
March 28, 2020. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19 Update):
FDA Revokes Emergency Use Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine (June
15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-updatefda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and. Based on the Agency’s ongoing
analysis of the EUA and emerging scientific data, the FDA revoked the EUA on June 15, 2020,
after concluding that the statutory criteria for an EUA were no longer met. Id.
90. Cannon v. Watermark Retirement Cmtys., Inc., No. 21-1451, 2021 WL 3033762, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 19, 2021).
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *3.
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explicit, and limited scope of the drug’s FDA emergency use authorization. Therefore, based on these allegations, the administration of
the treatment as Defendants used it cannot be considered a covered
countermeasure because it was not “authorized for investigational
or emergency use, as those terms are defined in the [FDCA,]” as
required by the PREP Act . . . . Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is denied.94

The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that immunity applies to the misuse of a covered countermeasure because
“[d]efendants did not ‘misuse’ a covered countermeasure because, in
order to misuse a covered countermeasure, the treatment in question
must first satisfy the definition of a covered countermeasure, which, as
explained above, [d]efendants’ administration of treatment to Cannon
does not.”95 Unlike other cases discussed next, the plaintiffs did not
seek to remand this case to a state court.
In many cases, defendants sought to remove the case to federal
court claiming, in part, that federal courts have original jurisdiction
because the actions are preempted by the PREP Act, a federal statute.96 The majority of courts addressing the complete preemption
question, even after the Secretary issued the January 2021 Advisory
Opinion, which stated the PREP Act “is a ‘complete preemption’ statute,”97 have held that the PREP Act does not, in fact, trigger complete
preemption.98
94. Id.
95. Id. at *4. The court also held that the defendant’s actions did not fall within the PREP
Act’s “safe harbor” provision, which provides immunity for a covered entity that “reasonably
could have believed” that the countermeasure administered “was (1) being administered to and
by the proper populations specified in the Secretary’s declaration and (2) being administered
within a proper geographic area specified in the Secretary’s declaration, even if the countermeasure did not actually satisfy those conditions.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(3)(C). The
court held that it was not reasonable for defendants to believe the administration of hydroxychloroquine was proper because the EUA “was unambiguous” as to where the drug needed to
be administered and to whom it could be administered. Cannon, 2021 WL 3033762, at *4.
96. See, e.g., Dupervil v. Alliance Health Operations, LLC, 516 F. Supp. 3d 238, 248
(E.D.N.Y. 2021); Estate of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr. I, 478 F. Supp. 3d 518,
523–24 (D. N.J. 2020).
97. ADVISORY OPINION NO. 21-01, supra note 68, at 2.
98. See e.g., Maglioli v. Alliance HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that the PREP Act does not completely preempt all state law claims); Leroy v. Hume, No.
20-CV-5325, 2021 WL 4350502, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021) (collecting cases and stating that
“[o]ver the past eighteen months, several dozen district courts have addressed the argument of
complete preemption put forth by defendants, and the overwhelming consensus among them is
that claims like plaintiffs’ are not completely preempted by the PREP Act”); Estate of Jenkins v.
Beverly Hills Senior Care Facility, Inc., No. CV-21-4902, 2021 WL 3563545, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
12, 2021) (collecting cases and stating that “[t]hese cases plainly hold that the PREP Act does
not ‘wholly displace’ state law claims that implicate healthcare entities and COVID-19”); Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic, No. CV-21-00510, 2021 WL 1851414, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2021) (collecting cases). While most defendants have not succeeded in removing the claims to federal courts
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In the cases alleging various failures, the alleged failures are broad
and go beyond, or do not even include, failures to use or administer
covered countermeasures. As noted, the fourth amendment to the
COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration made it clear that claims relating
to the failure to use or administer a covered countermeasure may fall
within the PREP Act’s liability protections if the failure resulted from
prioritizing or purposefully allocating covered countermeasures in
short supply.99 Of the cases discussing the fourth amendment and
HHS Advisory Opinion 21-01, which added additional clarity on this
point, the courts generally held that the specific facts of the case
brought it outside the narrow examples of inaction that can fall within
the PREP Act.100 The broader inaction claims in these cases included
“fail[ing] to properly implement an effective infection control program (including by failing to properly train staff);”101 “fail[ing] to
maintain sufficient staffing levels [and] fail[ing] to implement any
safety measures;”102 failing to provide adequate supplies of personal
protective equipment;103 and “failing to properly execute existing probased on the PREP Act, at least two courts have held that the PREP Act is a complete preemption statute. See Rachal v. Natchitoches Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. LLC, No. 1:21-CV-00334, 2021
WL 5449053, at *2 n.3 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2021) (“[T]he Court finds that the PREP Act is a
complete preemption statute, thus creating a federal cause of action as specified therein.”); Garcia v. Welltower OpCo Grp., 522 F. Supp. 3d 734, 743 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]he Court finds that
the PREP Act provides for complete preemption.”). Many courts within the Ninth Circuit—and
elsewhere—declined to follow Garcia, sometimes citing its failure to apply the proper complete
preemption test. See, e.g., Acra v. Cal. Magnolia Convalescent Hosp., Inc., No. 21-898, 2021 WL
2769041, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2021) (collecting cases). The question—and answer—of whether
the PREP Act is a complete preemption statute is beyond the scope of this Article.
99. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Estate of Costa v. WDW Joint Venture, No. CV-21-05762, 2021 WL 3089332, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2021); Jones v. Legacy Mgmt. Grp., No. 6:21-CV-00838, 2021 WL 3416993,
at *3–4 (W.D. La. July 7, 2021); Reed v. Sunbridge Hallmark Health Servs., LLC, No. CV-213702, 2021 WL 2633156, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2021); Stone v. Long Beach Healthcare Ctr.,
LLC, No. CV-21-326, 2021 WL 1163572, at *4–7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021); Anson v. HCP Prairie Village KS OPCO LLC, 523 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1300 (D. Kan. 2021).
101. Stone, 2021 WL 1163572, at *4 (concluding that PREP Act immunity for a failure to act
applies only “when the failure to administer a covered countermeasure to one individual has a
‘close causal relationship’ to the administration of that covered countermeasure to another individual . . . . Other ‘inaction claims’ may not”).
102. Nava v. Parkwest Rehab. Ctr. LLC, No. 2:20-CV-07571, 2021 WL 1253577, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 2021) (concluding that “state-law claims of negligence and wrongful death brought
against a nursing home for failure to protect against the spread of COVID-19 . . . are not properly characterized as federal-law claims under the PREP Act” (quoting Dupervil v. Alliance
Health Operations, LLC, 516 F. Supp. 3d 238, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2021))). See also Sherod v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 20cv1198, 2020 WL 6140474, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 16, 2020) (involving “inaction” claims in addition to failure to provide PPE, including failure to provide proper training, failure to follow federal guidance, and failure to implement various safety and preventative policies and procedures).
103. See, e.g., Estate of Jones v. St. Jude Operating Co., 524 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1104 (D. Or.
2021).
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tocols and procedures set in place to prevent the spread of the Covid19 virus.”104 Plaintiffs generally did not (1) claim that a covered countermeasure itself caused injury or death; (2) claim specifically that a
covered countermeasure was not used when the covered countermeasure was in short supply and allocated to another individual;105 or
(3) make claims against manufacturers of covered countermeasures.
Notwithstanding the positions taken by courts thus far with respect
to the application of the PREP Act during the COVID-19 pandemic,
it remains to be seen how a manufacturer of a covered COVID-19
countermeasure would fare in a lawsuit relating to the manufacturer’s
covered countermeasure(s). That said, because claims against manufacturers are more likely to involve the actual use or administration of
a covered countermeasure—which fall more clearly within the PREP
Act—manufacturers may not encounter the same problems as the facility defendants in the cases discussed above. Thus, unless plaintiffs
can meet the high bar of proving willful misconduct, compensation
through the CICP will provide their only recourse.
III. THE COUNTERMEASURES INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM
When enacting the PREP Act, which can cut off an injured individual’s ability to seek recourse through the courts, Congress recognized
the need to include an alternative form of relief for individuals injured
by covered countermeasures. Thus, Congress also added section 319F4 to the PHSA, which established the CICP, a no-fault compensation
program.106 This Part describes the CICP and its numerous limitations
and inadequacies.

104. Estate of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr. I, 478 F. Supp. 3d 518, 523 (D. N.J.
2020).
105. Although some claims included the failure to use PPE or failure to test residents and/or
staff for COVID-19, both of which could involve covered countermeasures, defendants typically
did not argue that these failures were because PPE or tests were in short supply and allocated to
others. For example, in Estate of Jenkins v. Beverly Hills Senior Care Facility, Inc., the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants “fail[ed] to test residents and/or staff for COVID-19 despite the
availability and feasibility of regular testing.” Estate of Jenkins v. Beverly Hills Senior Care Facility, Inc., No. CV-21-04902, 2021 WL 3563545, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) (emphasis added).
See also cases cited supra note 88.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e; see also Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP),
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Nov. 2020), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp. Regulations
promulgated by HHS govern CICP procedures and eligibility determinations. See generally 42
C.F.R. Part 110 (2020).
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A. Scope and Limitations of the Countermeasures Injury
Compensation Program
The CICP is a no-fault compensation program intended to provide
benefits to eligible persons (or their survivors) who sustain serious
physical injuries or death as a direct result of the administration or use
of a covered countermeasure pursuant to a PREP Act declaration.107
Eligible individuals may receive reimbursement for reasonable and
necessary medical expenses; loss of employment income; and survivor
benefits in the case of death if the Secretary determines the death was
a direct result of a covered injury.108 The CICP has a number of important limitations, and it has been criticized as an inadequate mechanism for compensating individuals harmed by covered
countermeasures.109
First, “eligible individuals” (or their survivors) are those who suffer
death or serious physical injury directly caused by the administration
of a covered countermeasure pursuant to a PREP Act declaration.110
A “serious physical injury” is defined as “an injury that (A) is life
threatening; (B) results in permanent impairment of a body function
or permanent damage to a body structure; or (C) necessitates medical
or surgical intervention to preclude permanent impairment of a body
function or permanent damage to a body structure.”111 The CICP regulations state further that “[a]s a general matter, only injuries that
warrant[ ] hospitalization (whether or not the person was actually hospitalized) or injuries that led to a significant loss of function or disability (whether or not hospitalization was warranted) will be considered
serious injuries.”112 Additionally, “[i]njuries resulting from the underlying condition for which the countermeasure was administered or
used,” such as if the covered countermeasure was ineffective in treat107. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a).
108. 42 C.F.R. §§ 110.2, 110.31, 110.32, 110.33 (2010).
109. See Tom Hals, COVID-19 Era Highlights U.S. ‘Black Hole’ Compensation Fund for Pandemic Vaccine Injuries, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2020, 6:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-vaccines-liability/covid-19-era-highlights-u-s-black-hole-compensation-fundfor-pandemic-vaccine-injuries-idUSKBN25H1E8; Mary Shinn, After Suffering COVID-19 Vaccine-Caused Blood Clots, Colorado Springs Woman Sees Problems with Federal Compensation
System, THE GAZETTE (June 19, 2021), https://gazette.com/news/after-suffering-covid-19-vaccine-caused-blood-clots-colorado-springs-woman-sees-problems-with-federal/article_4dff7f24bf26-11eb-bc0c-2f09adb3f051.html; Jake Daly, Liability For Injuries Caused by COVID-19 Vaccines, FREEMAN, MATHIS, & GRAY LLP BLOGLINE (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.fmglaw.com/
FMGBlogLine/business-litigation/liability-for-injuries-caused-by-covid-19-vaccines/.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(e)(5) (defining “eligible individual”); id. § 247d-6e(e)(2) (defining
“covered individual”); id. § 247d-6e(e)(3) (defining “covered injury”).
111. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(10).
112. 42 C.F.R. § 110.3(z).
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ing or preventing the underlying condition or disease, are not considered covered injuries.113 For example, an individual who receives a
COVID-19 vaccine, but is later diagnosed with COVID-19, would not
be able to seek compensation for harms caused by the disease itself
based on an argument that the vaccine was ineffective.114
Second, numerous procedural limitations make it difficult to obtain
compensation through the CICP. For example, there is a rebuttable
presumption that a covered countermeasure is the cause of an injury
only if it is set forth in a Covered Countermeasure Injury Table (Table) and only if the injury occurred within a specified time period and
at a specific level of severity.115 Further, even if a Table’s requirements are satisfied, the presumption may be rebutted if the Secretary
determines, after reviewing the evidence, that a source other than the
countermeasure more likely caused the injury.116 The Secretary may,
but is not required to, obtain the opinions of qualified medical experts
in making determinations concerning covered injuries.117 For injuries
not listed in a Table, “the requester must demonstrate that the injury
occurred as the direct result of the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure.”118 This requires proof “based on compelling, reliable, valid, medical and scientific evidence. Temporal association between receipt of the countermeasure and onset of the injury is not
sufficient by itself to prove that the countermeasure caused the injury.”119 As of March 2022, there are two tables: one for pandemic
influenza countermeasures and one for smallpox countermeasures.120
Unless and until a table is created for COVID-19 countermeasures,
those seeking compensation must meet the higher “direct result”
standard.121
Other procedural limitations include a one-year statute of limitations.122 Specifically, requests “must be filed within one year of the
date of the administration or use of a covered countermeasure that is
113. Id. § 110.20(d).
114. This limitation, however, is logical and important, given that no medical product can
guarantee 100% efficacy.
115. 42 C.F.R. § 110.20(b). Guillain-Barré syndrome, for example, is presumed to be caused
by the 2009 H1N1 vaccine if its onset occurs three to forty-two days after administration of the
vaccine. Id. § 110.100(a).
116. Id. § 110.20(b).
117. Id. § 110.20(a).
118. Id. § 110.20(c) (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 110.100.
121. Id. § 110.3(g).
122. Id. § 110.42(a).
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alleged to have caused the injury.”123 Further, the process is handled
entirely within HHS rather than a court; there is no right to a hearing;
and although one step administrative reconsideration is possible, no
judicial appeal is permitted.124
Third, Congress funds the CICP through emergency appropriations
to the Covered Countermeasures Process Fund (Countermeasures
Fund).125 However, the PREP Act does not allocate money to the
fund nor does it mandate that the CICP be funded adequately.126
With respect to COVID-19, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) and the Coronavirus Preparedness
and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act (CPRSA) appropriated funds that HHS may, but is not required to, use for the Countermeasures Fund. The CPRSA appropriated $3.1 billion to the
Secretary to respond to COVID-19, including for the development
and purchase of countermeasures, and allows, but does not require,
these funds to “be transferred to, and merged with” the Countermeasures Fund.127 The CARES Act appropriated $27 billion to the Secretary for similar purposes and also allows, but does not require, the
Secretary to transfer funds to the Countermeasures Fund.128 Whether
any of the appropriated money is transferred to the Countermeasures
Fund thus remains at the discretion of the Secretary.
Along with uncertain funding, awards for damages are limited. For
example, the CICP limits lost income recovery to $50,000 for each
year of lost work, with no adjustments for inflation, and it does not
pay benefits for lost employment income after the individual turns
sixty-five years old.129 The CICP does not compensate for pain, suffering, or emotional distress, nor does it pay attorneys’ fees and costs.130
Additionally, the CICP is the “payer of last resort” and will only cover
123. Id. If a new Covered Countermeasure Injury Table is issued or an existing Table is
amended, a one-year extension is provided to those requesters who could not establish an injury
before the new or amended Table was issued. Id. § 110.42(f).
124. Id. §§ 110.90–92.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a).
126. Copper, supra note 14, at 91; Marino, supra note 37, at 211 (referring to the CICP as an
“unfunded compensation scheme”).
127. Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub.
L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146, 147 (2020).
128. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281,
560–61 (2020).
129. 42 C.F.R. § 110.81(c)(2), (c)(4).
130. KEVIN J. HICKEY & ERIN H. WARD, COMPENSATION PROGRAMS FOR POTENTIAL
COVID-19 VACCINE INJURIES 3 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/
LSB10584.
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expenses or provide benefits that other third-party payers (e.g., health
insurance, workers’ compensation, etc.) are not obligated to pay.131
Finally, the CICP lacks transparency. Decisions are not made public, and the CICP has been described as “secretive”132 and “extremely
narrow and hard to win.”133 As of February 1, 2022, the CICP had
received 7,033 claims since it began in 2010, with 6,940 claims deemed
eligible for medical review.134 Of these, only forty were found eligible
for compensation and only twenty-nine received compensation, totaling more than $6 million.135 One claim was pending as of February 1,
2022, and ten claims did not receive compensation because they did
not have any compensable expenses or losses.136 Of the claims eligible
for medical review as of February 1, 2022, 363 had been denied and
6,537 were pending or in review.137 The full decisions are not made
public, but information provided by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) shows that of the cases found eligible
for compensation, most were related to the H1N1 vaccine and Guillain-Barré syndrome, a neurological disorder.138
Of the 6,540 COVID-19 countermeasure claims filed as of February
1, 2022, allegations of injury or death due to a COVID-19 vaccine accounted for 3,700 claims, and 2,840 claims alleged injuries or death
131. 42 C.F.R. § 110.3(q) (defining “payer of last resort”); id. § 110.3(ee) (defining “thirdparty payer”).
132. Jodie Fleisher et al., Critics Question Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Readiness as
COVID-19 Claims Come In, NBC MIAMI (Feb. 25, 2021, 7:02 PM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/
investigations/critics-question-vaccine-injury-compensation-program-readiness-as-covid-19claims-come-in/2392118/ (“It’s always been so secretive . . . .” (quoting Professor Peter Myers));
see also Peter H. Meyers, The Trump Administration’s Flawed Decision on Coronavirus Vaccine
Injury Compensation: Recommendations for Changes, 7 J.L. & THE BIOSCIS. 1, 1 (2020) (“There
is a lack of transparency and no meaningful opportunity for petitioners to participate in the
administrative proceedings within [HHS] in which their claims for compensation are decided.”);
Hals, supra note 109 (referencing Professor Meyers’s description of the CICP as a “ ‘black hole’
process”).
133. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Congress Should Enact No-Fault Compensation for COVID-19
Vaccine Injuries, BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 5, 2021), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/
01/05/covid-vaccine-injury-compensation/.
134. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVS. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-data. Of those deemed ineligible
for medical review, thirty-eight missed the filing deadline, and fifty-five did not involve a covered product or the product was not specified. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Table 2. CICP Claims Compensated (Fiscal Years 2010 – 2022) As of February 1,
2022, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicpdata#table-2 [hereinafter Table 2]; Table 3. CICP Claims Eligible for Compensation, but No Eligible Reported Losses or Expenses (Fiscal Years 2010 – 2022) As of February 1, 2022, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-data#table-3.

R
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from other COVID-19 countermeasures.139 As of February 1, 2022,
the CICP had not compensated any COVID-19 countermeasures
claims and had denied four claims “because the standard of proof for
causation was not met and/or a covered injury was not sustained.”140
One claim, a COVID-19 vaccine claim for an anaphylactic reaction,
had been deemed eligible for compensation and was pending review
of eligible expenses.141
Clearly, the COVID-19 pandemic and widespread use of countermeasures has led to an unprecedented number of filings with the
CICP. This provides an opportune time to revisit the CICP and its
many shortcomings. When considering potential reforms to the CICP,
the VICP, another no-fault compensation program, provides a helpful
comparison, which this Article turns to next.
B. Comparison to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
This Article covers more than vaccines, but claims relating to
COVID-19 vaccines will likely constitute a large percentage of claims
made for COVID-19 countermeasures, simply given the number of
individuals who have received or will receive a COVID-19 vaccine.
Indeed, based on data provided by the HRSA, approximately 57% of
the COVID-19 countermeasure claims filed as of February 1, 2022,
involved COVID-19 vaccines.142 As of February 2022, all the COVID19 vaccines authorized or approved for use in the United States were
covered under the CICP rather than the VICP.143
139. Table 1. Alleged COVID-19 Countermeasure Claims Filed as of February 1, 2022,
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicpdata#table-1 [hereinafter Table 1]. This second category includes 295 claims relating to failures
to follow or enact certain procedures to reduce the risk of infection. Id.
140. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data, supra note 134.
141. Id.
142. This number was calculated by taking the total number of COVID-19 vaccine countermeasure claims filed as of February 1, 2022, (3,700) and dividing it by the total number of
COVID-19 countermeasure claims filed as of February 1, 2022 (6,540). Table 1, supra note 139.
143. Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 2022), https://
www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/faq. The EUA “Fact Sheets” provided to patients and/or
caregivers include information about the CICP. See, e.g., PFIZER, VACCINE INFORMATION FACT
SHEET FOR RECIPIENTS AND CAREGIVERS ABOUT COMIRNATY (COVID-19 VACCINE, MRNA)
AND THE PFIZER-BIONTECH COVID-19 VACCINE TO PREVENT CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
(COVID-19) FOR USE IN INDIVIDUALS 12 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER 8 (Jan. 31, 2022), https://
www.fda.gov/media/153716/download [hereinafter PFIZER-BIONTECH, FACT SHEET FOR 12
YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER]; MODERNA, VACCINE INFORMATION FACT SHEET FOR RECIPIENTS
AND CAREGIVERS ABOUT SPIKEVAX (COVID-19 VACCINE, MRNA) AND THE MODERNA
COVID-19 VACCINE TO PREVENT CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN INDIVIDUALS
18 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER 6 (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/media/144638/download
[hereinafter MODERNA, FACT SHEET]; JANSSEN, FACT SHEET FOR RECIPIENTS AND
CAREGIVERS: EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION (EUA) OF THE JANSSEN COVID-19 VACCINE
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The VICP was created by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986 (Vaccine Act),144 and provides liability protections for
vaccine manufacturers and administrators as well as a no-fault alternative to the traditional tort system to compensate individuals found to
be injured by certain vaccines.145 Injury compensation through the
VICP is available for many vaccines routinely administered in the
United States that are listed in the Vaccine Injury Table.146 For a new
category of vaccines to be covered under the VICP, three things must
occur: “(1) Congress must enact an excise tax on the vaccine, (2) the
CDC must recommend it for routine administration to children or
pregnant women, and (3) the Secretary must publish a notice of coverage in the Federal Register.”147
The VICP applies to vaccine-related deaths or injuries that (1) have
effects lasting for more than six months after administration of the
vaccine, or (2) result in inpatient hospitalization and surgery.148 The
VICP has a slightly more generous statute of limitations than the
CICP, ranging from two to four years, depending on the specific
claim.149 The statute of limitations is based on the date of death or the
PREVENT CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN INDIVIDUALS 18 YEARS OF AGE AND
OLDER 7–8 (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/media/146305/download [hereinafter JANSSEN,
FACT SHEET]; PFIZER-BIONTECH, VACCINE INFORMATION FACT SHEET FOR RECIPIENTS AND
CAREGIVERS ABOUT THE PFIZER-BIONTECH COVID-19 VACCINE TO PREVENT CORONAVIRUS
DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) FOR USE IN INDIVIDUALS 5 THROUGH 11 YEARS OF AGE 6–7 (Jan. 3,
2022), https://www.fda.gov/media/153717/download [hereinafter PFIZER-BIONTECH, FACT
SHEET FOR AGES 5 THROUGH 11].
144. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 301–23, 100
Stat. 3743, 3755–84 (Nov. 14, 1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–34 (1986)); see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10(a) (1989) (establishing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
145. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 143.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (original Table); Vaccine Injury Table, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/vaccinecompensation/
vaccineinjurytable.pdf (providing the Table applicable to petitions for compensation filed on or
after March 21, 2017).
147. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Rescission of Revisions to the Vaccine
Injury Table, 86 Fed. Reg. 21,209, 21,211–12 (Apr. 22, 2021). As of March 2022, the CDC recommends COVID-19 vaccination for everyone five years of age and older, including people who are
pregnant. COVID-19 Vaccines While Pregnant or Breastfeeding, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/recommendations/pregnancy.html; COVID-19 Vaccines for Children and Teens, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/
recommendations/children-teens.html. As of March 2022, however, COVID-19 vaccines remain
covered countermeasures under the CICP and not the VICP. Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 143.
148. See Comparison of Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.
(Apr. 2021), https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-vicp [hereinafter Comparison of CICP to VICP].
149. Who Can File a Petition, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 2022), https://
www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/eligible/index.html.
TO
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date of “the first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation” of the injury, rather than the date on which the vaccine was administered.150
Unlike the CICP, the VICP may provide compensation for pain and
suffering and attorneys’ fees.151 Claims are filed in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims and hearings are held before independent special masters.152 Public decisions are issued after the proceedings, thereby providing the public with information about which injuries have or have
not been found to be caused by a vaccine.153 There is a right to appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.154 Furthermore,
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund receives consistent funding from a $0.75 excise tax on each dose of a covered vaccine, in contrast to discretionary appropriations like the CICP.155
From October 1, 1988, (the beginning of the VICP) through March
1, 2022, the VICP had received 24,824 petitions and 20,797 had been
adjudicated.156 Of the petitions adjudicated, 8,767 were deemed eligible for compensation and 12,030 were dismissed.157 As of March 1,
2022, over $4.7 billion had been awarded from the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund, with over $4.3 billion awarded to petitioners and the rest awarded for attorneys’ fees/costs.158 To compare this
with the awards from the CICP: approximately 42% of adjudicated
petitions have been found eligible for compensation through the
VICP159 compared to approximately 9% of requests submitted to the
CICP.160 And the average payout under the VICP is approximately
150. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16; 42 C.F.R. § 110.42(a). With limited exceptions, all petitions must be
filed within three years after the first symptom of the alleged vaccine injury or within two years
of the death and four years after the first symptom of the alleged vaccine injury that resulted in
death. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4), (e); Comparison of CICP to VICP, supra note 148.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)–(d).
153. Id. § 300aa-12(d).
154. See id. § 300aa-12(f); Comparison of CICP to VICP, supra note 148.
155. About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 2022), https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/about/index.html.
156. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM DATA REPORT 1 (Mar. 1, 2022), [hereinafter NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY DATA]
(data on file with author). “On average, it takes 2–3 years to adjudicate a petition after it is
filed.” Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 1.
158. Id. at 9.
159. This figure was calculated by taking the total number of claims found eligible for compensation as of March 1, 2022, (8,767) and dividing it by the number of claims adjudicated
(20,797). Id. at 5, 7.
160. This figure was calculated by taking the number of requests found eligible for compensation as of February 1, 2022, (40) and dividing it by the total number of requests for which a
decision had been made (i.e., not pending) (456) (363 eligible for medical review and denied; 93
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$501,093 (not including attorney’s fees)161 compared to $209,520
under the CICP.162
Although not without its own limitations and critics,163 the VICP
provides a reasonable model from which to build when considering
reforms to the CICP. Reforms are imperative to ensure that people
injured by covered countermeasures are compensated adequately
through a fair, transparent, efficient, and accessible process.
IV. IMPROVING

THE

COUNTERMEASURES INJURY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM

Part III illustrated how the CICP fails to provide adequate recourse
for individuals harmed by covered countermeasures. This Part unpacks the importance of a robust compensation program and proposes
potential reforms to address the CICP’s inadequacies.
A. Importance of a Robust Compensation Program
This Article does not take issue with the liability protections provided to manufacturers of covered countermeasures under the PREP
Act. On the contrary, it recognizes the importance of the liability protections, which are critical to encouraging the research and development of countermeasures both prior to and during a public health
emergency. These protections help ensure that countermeasures “are
made available during [a] pandemic without hesitation.”164 As noted
ineligible for medical review). See Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data,
supra note 134.
161. This figure was calculated by taking the total “petitioners’ award amount”
($4,357,511,715.61) and dividing it by the number of awards compensated (8,696) as of March 1,
2022. See NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY DATA, supra note 156, at 9.
162. This figure was calculated by taking the total compensation paid under the CICP
($6,076,087.47) and dividing it by the number of claims compensated (29) as of February 1, 2022.
See Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data, supra note 134.
163. See, e.g., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Fund, CHILD. HEALTH DEF., https://childrenshealthdefense.org/national-vaccine-injury-compensation-program/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2022) (“Despite Congress’s intentions, [the VICP] has produced . . . insufficient compensation
for the vaccine-injured.”); Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, COVID-19 Vaccine Liability — What are the
Legal Facts and Limits, SKEPTICAL RAPTOR (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.skepticalraptor.com/
skepticalraptorblog.php/COVID-19-vaccine-liability-what-are-the-legal-facts-and-limits/#Liability_limits_on_routine_vaccines (noting some drawbacks of the VICP, such as certain caps on
compensation for pain and suffering).
164. Examining the Reauthorization of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomitt. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong.
160 (2018) (Letter from Charles D. “Chuck” Johnson, Jr., President, Int’l Safety Equip. Association, to Hon. Greg Walden, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce et al. (May 31,
2018)); see also Fleisher et al., supra note 132 (“When a public health emergency happens, we
don’t want manufacturers to be afraid of liability and not pursue a countermeasure that could
save many, many lives.” (quoting Dr. Vito Caserta, former director of the CICP)).
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by President George W. Bush during a speech about the nation’s influenza preparedness efforts, litigation represents “one of the greatest
obstacles to domestic vaccine production.”165 To encourage and increase domestic vaccine development, President Bush stated that
“Congress must pass liability protection for the makers of life-saving
vaccines,” a goal he accomplished through the PREP Act.166
This Article also does not intend to suggest that available COVID19 vaccines and therapeutics are unsafe or likely to cause harm to a
significant number of individuals. On the contrary, this Article is premised on the belief—as supported by current data—that the countermeasures’ benefits outweigh their risks and that the FDA, CDC, other
regulatory authorities, and the countermeasures’ manufacturers all
have robust procedures in place to perform post-authorization safety
monitoring.167 Further, although the evidentiary bar for issuing EUAs
is lower than that required for full approval/licensure, the FDA took a
relatively conservative approach to therapeutic and vaccine EUAs
during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to prior EUAs. In general,
the Agency required positive data from at least one randomized
clinical trial to support an EUA. The FDA required larger trials for
vaccines than for therapeutics and required COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers to conduct post-authorization observational studies to evaluate the association between the vaccine and certain adverse events.168
165. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Outlines Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response (Nov. 1, 2005), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2005/11/20051101-1.html (providing transcript of speech given by President George W. Bush at
the William Natcher Center, National Institutes of Health, in Bethesda, Maryland).
166. Id.; see also The Next Flu Pandemic: Evaluating U.S. Readiness: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (stating that to encourage companies to engage in
U.S.-based vaccine manufacturing, “[w]e need protections against the liabilities that [such companies] face.” (quoting Dr. Anthony Fauci, Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases,
Nat’l Inst. of Health)).
167. Cf. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, FDA and CDC Lift Recommended Pause on Johnson & Johnson (Janssen) COVID-19 Vaccine Use Following Thorough
Safety Review (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-andcdc-lift-recommended-pause-johnson-johnson-janssen-covid-19-vaccine-use-following-thorough
(“The surveillance systems that are in place to monitor the safety of COVID-19 vaccines authorized for emergency use are working, as demonstrated by both agencies’ quick work to identify
and investigate these rare, but serious adverse events.”).
168. See, e.g., Letter from Jacqueline A. O’Shaughnessy, Acting Chief Scientist, Food & Drug
Admin., to Michelle Olsen, ModernaTX, Inc. 16 (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/media/
144636/download (letter authorizing the emergency use of Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine); Letter from Jacqueline A. O’Shaughnessy, Acting Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Ruta
Walawalkar, Janssen Biotech, Inc. 9 (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/146303/
download (letter authorizing the emergency use of the Janssen COVID-19 vaccine); Letter from
Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Elisa Harkins, Pfizer Inc. 8 (May 10,
2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/144412/download (letter authorizing the emergency use of the
Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL214.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 29

INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM

6-JUN-22

12:51

717

According to the CDC, “COVID-19 vaccines are safe and effective,” and they are receiving “the most intensive safety monitoring in
US history.”169 Some vaccine recipients experience no side effects,
while others experience common vaccine side effects such as swelling,
redness, pain at the injection site, tiredness, and headaches.170 A small
number of recipients may experience serious, but very rare, adverse
events such as anaphylaxis, thrombosis with thrombocytopenia, myocarditis, pericarditis, or Guillain-Barré syndrome.171 The CDC notes,
however, that long-term health problems following any vaccine are
“extremely unusual.”172 In fact, vaccine side effects typically occur
within six weeks of receiving a vaccine.173 Prior to authorization, the
COVID-19 vaccines were required to be studied for at least eight
weeks after the final dose.174
Despite the overall safety of COVID-19 vaccines, side effects can
occur, a small proportion of which may be serious or even fatal.175
Causation, however, can be difficult to prove, and reports of adverse
events do not necessarily mean that a vaccine caused the event.176 In
fact, the CDC accepts reports of any adverse event following a vaccination, regardless of whether there is evidence of a causal link between the vaccine and the adverse event.177 Nevertheless, because
harms can occur, strong liability protections must be provided in conjunction with a robust no-fault compensation program for such harms.
All medical products come with some risk. And the broader a product’s use, the greater the number of individuals who may experience
an adverse event. Indeed, this is expected once a product is used
outside clinical trials, which can lead to the discovery of new, previously unknown/unexpected adverse events.178
169. Safety of COVID-19 Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 28,
2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/safety/safety-of-vaccines.html.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Possible Side Effects After Getting a COVID-19 Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/expect/
after.html.
174. Id.
175. Selected Adverse Event Reports after COVID-19 Vaccination, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 18, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/
safety/adverse-events.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. For example, the Fact Sheets for vaccine recipients and caregivers all state that the side
effects listed in the Fact Sheet “may not be all the possible side effects” of the vaccine and that
“serious and unexpected side effects may occur” (emphasis added). See, e.g., PFIZER-BIONTECH,
FACT SHEET FOR 12 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, supra note 143, at 5. MODERNA, FACT SHEET,
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Just as liability protections are important to foster the research and
development of countermeasures, a robust and effective compensation program proves similarly important to encourage the public to
actually use these countermeasures when needed, especially among
the most hesitant.
The public was asked to trust the vaccine development and distribution process,179 and building public trust and confidence represents a
critical component of increasing vaccine acceptance and instilling confidence in the countermeasure authorization process more generally.
In exchange for such trust, the public needs assurance that in the rare
event something does go wrong, they will not be left without recourse.180 Surveys over the course of the pandemic show that the intent to get a COVID-19 vaccine increased steadily after hitting a low
supra note 143, at 4; JANSSEN, FACT SHEET, supra note 143, at 5; PFIZER-BIONTECH, FACT
SHEET FOR AGES 5 THROUGH 11, supra note 143, at 4. A key purpose of postmarketing surveillance systems and requirements is to identify new or unexpected adverse events. See Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/surveillance/postmarketing-surveillance-programs (“Because all possible side effects of a
drug can’t be anticipated based on preapproval studies involving only several hundred to several
thousand patients, FDA maintains a system of postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment
programs to identify adverse events that did not appear during the drug approval process.”); see
also Jamie Ducharme, People are Reporting Unexpected Side Effects After COVID-19 Vaccination—But That’s Actually Normal, TIME (Apr. 22, 2021, 5:39 PM), https://time.com/5957222/
covid-vaccine-side-effects/ (“There are bound to be more side effects observed and reported by
the general population than are uncovered during a clinical trial . . . . Even side effects that were
uncommon during clinical trials may affect a relatively large number of people once vaccines are
widely distributed . . . .” (paraphrasing Dr. Stanley Perlman, Professor, Univ. of Iowa Carver
Coll. of Med. and member of the FDA’s vaccine advisory committee)).
179. See, e.g., Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: July 2021, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid19-vaccine-monitor-july-2021/; Marissa Tansino, ‘Trust the Process’: Health Department Prepared
to Store Vaccine, Says Widespread Use Needed to Stop COVID-19 Spread, KARE11 (Dec. 3, 2020,
10:16 PM), https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/covid-19-vaccine-health-department-prepared-to-store/83-c716d528-0bc8-4b62-9020-1d81e39c60bd (asking the public to trust the process, stating “[a]lthough vaccines were developed quickly over the course of this year, corners
were not cut” (quoting Dr. Mandy Cohen, Sec’y, N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.)); Joseph
Spector, Dr. Fauci Urges Governors to Accept FDA Approval of COVID Vaccine: ‘It is a Sound
Process’, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Nov. 24, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.
com/story/news/2020/11/24/fauci-covid-vaccine-safe-states-new-york-cuomo/6403986002/ (quoting Dr. Anthony Fauci, Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, who asked states to
“trust the process” of the development and review of COVID-19 vaccines).
180. Kendra Lippy, for example, was hospitalized for twenty-two days in the intensive care
unit after she developed severe blood clots thought to be caused by the Johnson & Johnson/
Janssen vaccine. Shinn, supra note 109. She is now hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt and
wants to see the CICP, “a complex and opaque federal compensation system . . . improved.” Id.
(noting the backlog of cases in the VICP). Cf. Jennifer Schlesinger & Karina Hernandez, Compensation for Victims of COVID Vaccine Injuries is Limited, CNBC (Mar. 25, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/25/compensation-for-victims-of-covid-vaccine-injuries-is-limited.html (discussing amendments to the VICP, Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.) stated that “[i]t
will encourage confidence to know that in the extraordinarily unlikely event, maybe 1 in a mil-
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point in 2020. Yet, as of February 2022, the percentage of adults saying
they would “definitely not” get the vaccine (16%) had held relatively
steady since December 2020.181 Importantly, studies found that unvaccinated adults often expressed a lack of confidence in the safety of
available vaccines.182
An effective, fair, and transparent compensation program can reduce hesitancy caused by a lack of trust,183 concerns about safety,184
and skepticism of liability protections.185 A “robust and reassuring”
compensation program “serves a dual role by protecting and guaranteeing compensation for those harmed by vaccines and by reassuring
lion chance, that you suffer adverse consequences, that there is a fund there to protect you so
that you are not saddled with big medical bills and other loss”).
181. KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/dashboard/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-dashboard/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2022). The percentage of Americans who said they would get a COVID-19 vaccine fluctuated
throughout the pandemic. Id. According to data collected by the Pew Research Center in September 2020, 51% of U.S. adults said they “definitely” or “probably” would get a vaccine. Cary
Funk & Alex Tyson, Growing Share of Americans Say They Plan to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine –
or Already Have, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/
2021/03/05/growing-share-of-americans-say-they-plan-to-get-a-covid-19-vaccine-or-already-have/
. By February 2021, 19% had received at least one dose of the vaccine, and an additional 49%
said they “probably” or “definitely” would get a vaccine. Id. In September 2020, 49% had said
they “probably” or “definitely” would not get a vaccine, but by February 2021, this had decreased to 30%. Id.
182. Kirzinger et al., supra note 179.
183. Analyses by the Pew Research Center found that trust in the vaccine research and development process is tied strongly to attitudes and behaviors about vaccines. Funk & Tyson, supra
note 181. Intent to receive a vaccine was seventy-five points higher among those with a high trust
in the process. Id.
184. Id.
185. Shannon Kruner, clinical psychologist and executive director of Freedom of Religion–United Solutions, believes that much hesitancy “stems from ‘the risk of injury and lack of
liability that comes with vaccination.’ ” Hollie McKay, What’s Driving Coronavirus Hesitancy in
US?, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020, 4:42 PM), https://www.foxnews.com/health/coronavirus-hesitancywhat-is-driving-it. She also cites the accelerated development of the vaccines and “being forced
to consume a product ‘where injury is possible and where there is no liability.’ ” Id. Vaccine
opponents frequently cite liability protections as a reason to not trust vaccines. See e.g., Barbara
Loe Fisher, Vaccination: What’s Trust Got to Do With It?, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR. (Sept. 13,
2020, 8:23:57 AM), https://www.nvic.org/nvic-vaccine-news/september-2020/vaccination-whatstrust-got-to-do-with-it.aspx (“Now the people are being told that there is one – and only one –
simple solution to resolving the [COVID-19] crisis and getting back to normal: that is . . . for
every person living in every country to get injected with one of the liability-free COVID-19
vaccines being fast tracked to market.”); Vaccine Safety Group Calls Liability Protection With
No Compensation for the Vaccine Injured ‘Heartless’, INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Jan. 17,
2003), https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/view/vaccine-safety-group-calls-liability-protection-no-compensation-vaccine-injured (“If you combine mandated vaccines with no liability and
no accountability for anyone involved, it is a prescription for injustice and abuse of the public
trust.” (quoting Barbara Loe Fisher, co-founder and president of the National Vaccine Information Center, a well-known anti-vaccine group)).
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the broader public that these situations are exceptionally rare.”186 Angela Marie Wulbrecht, who experienced severe side effects after receiving the COVID-19 vaccine, said she still supports the vaccination
campaign, “[b]ut it would help those who are hesitant if they took care
of those of us who got injured.”187 As stated astutely by Professor
Katherine Van Tassel, “if you’re going to take one for the team, the
team has to have your back. . . . That’s a moral imperative.”188 The
CICP cannot achieve this as currently structured.
B. Amending the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program
A frequently proposed reform would require coverage of COVID19 vaccines under the VICP rather than CICP.189 This approach, however, proves problematic for a few reasons.
First, doing so would remove liability protections for certain categories of “covered persons” who are protected under the COVID-19
PREP Act Declaration but not the Vaccine Act, which only provides
liability protections to vaccine manufacturers and administrators. For
example, this would eliminate liability protections for covered persons
such as program planners, retail pharmacies, private nursing homes,
or other entities such as employers or schools involved in vaccine
administration.190
186. The Path Forward on COVID-19 Immunizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 117th Cong. 10 (2021) (written testimony of Ashish
K. Jha, Professor of Health Servs., Policy, & Practice, Dean of the Sch. of Pub. Health, Brown
Univ.) [hereinafter Written Testimony of Professor Jha].
187. Arthur Allen, Federal Vaccine Court Hasn’t Helped Those Whose Lives Were Altered by
COVID-19 Shots, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/
2021-08-17/severe-covid-vaccine-injuries-help-federal-vaccine-court. Wulbrecht filed a claim in
February 2021 with the CICP. Id. She received a note acknowledging her claim but as of August
2021, had not heard anything further. Id. She had to leave her job and has experienced “severe
fatigue, brain fog, imbalance and other symptoms” since receiving the vaccine. Id. Even though
she has health insurance, she has still paid at least $35,000 in out-of-pocket medical expenses. Id.
188. Id.; see also Avian Flu Addressing the Global Threat: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) (“[W]e cannot give millions of vaccinations knowing that
there is going to be side effects, and leave these people high and dry if they are damaged.”
(quoting Sen. Dan Burton)); Jacquie Lee & Ian Lopez, COVID-19 Vaccine Recipients Face Injury Payment ‘Black Hole’, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 23, 2021, 5:16 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/covid-19-vaccine-recipients-face-injury-payment-black-hole (“If we’re going to ask the soldiers to enter the battlefield of public health—
which we need . . . to create the herd immunity that is so necessary for our collective wellbeing—we need to make sure when those soldiers are downed on the battlefield, they are cared
for.” (quoting Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom)).
189. Written Testimony of Professor Jha, supra note 186, at 10; Meyers, supra note 132, at 5;
Katherine Van Tassel et al., Covid-19 Vaccine Injuries — Preventing Inequities in Compensation,
384 N. ENG. J. MED. e34(1), e34(2)–(3) (2021); Reiss, supra note 133.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(6) (defining “program planner”); ADVISORY OPINION NO. 20-04,
supra note 29, at 2–3 (discussing the definition of “program planner”).
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Second, the Vaccine Act provides less robust liability protections
than the PREP Act. For example, the Vaccine Act generally only covers claims for injuries caused by receipt of a “properly prepared” vaccine that is “accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”191
Among others, claims relating to circumstances surrounding vaccine
administration but unrelated to the vaccine itself, such as failure to
obtain informed consent, or claims relating to failure to vaccinate due
to short supply and purposeful allocation, would generally not receive
protection.192 The PREP Act provides broader coverage, going beyond claims related to the actual administration of the vaccine.193
Third, the VICP itself has faults and needs reforms. Amendments to
the VICP have been proposed, such as (1) increasing staffing and
funding, including an increase in the number of special masters that
hear claims to reduce a backlog of cases and to ensure more timely
decisions; and (2) increasing the caps on compensation to be adjusted
for inflation.194
Lastly, simply transferring COVID-19 vaccines to the VICP would
leave claims relating to other countermeasures subject to the inadequate CICP. While this Article focuses on vaccines, requests have
been and will continue to be made for therapeutics, devices, and diagnostics.195 All covered countermeasures should be subject to the same
liability protections and compensation system. Thus, merely transferring COVID-19 vaccines to the VICP would be an inadequate and
incomplete solution.
The following sections outline some of the key areas that should be
addressed to make the CICP more effective, fair, and transparent.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
192. Cheri Falvey et al., PREP Act Protections for COVID-19 Vaccine Liability,
PHARMEXEC.COM (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.pharmexec.com/view/prep-act-protections-forcovid-19-vaccine-liability.
193. As discussed in Part I.A., the PREP Act applies to:
[A]ny claim for loss that has a causal relationship with the administration to or use by
an individual of a covered countermeasure, including a causal relationship with the
design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution,
formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of such countermeasure.
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
194. On June 1, 2021, Representatives Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.) and Fred Upton (R-Mich.)
introduced the Vaccine Injury Compensation Modernization Act of 2021. Among other things,
the Act would increase the number of special masters to reduce the current case backlog, increase compensation based on inflation, and increase the statute of limitations to five years. See
Vaccine Injury Compensation Modernization Act of 2021, H.R. 3655, 117th Cong. (1st Sess.
2021); see also Written Testimony of Professor Jha, supra note 186, at 10–11 (making recommendations); Shinn, supra note 109 (noting the backlog of cases in the VICP).
195. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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These suggestions are not exhaustive, but rather a starting point to
highlight major concerns. As the world emerges from an unprecedented global pandemic, reforms to the CICP are necessary to ensure
that those injured by COVID-19 countermeasures receive the attention and compensation they deserve.
1. Funding
The CICP is likely unprepared to handle a pandemic of COVID19’s magnitude. During the H1N1 pandemic, for example, approximately 81–123 million Americans over the age of six months received
the H1N1 vaccine.196 In contrast, as of March 2, 2022, over 253 million
Americans five years of age and older had received at least one dose
of a COVID-19 vaccine.197 Unlike the H1N1 vaccine data, which included the pediatric population over the age of six months, the
COVID-19 numbers do not include the full pediatric population, as no
COVID-19 vaccine is yet authorized or approved for use in children
under five.198 Furthermore, these numbers do not even consider
claims that could be made for other COVID-19 countermeasures,
such as therapeutics, devices, and diagnostics. As of March 4, 2022,
over 821 million COVID-19 lab tests had been reported to the
CDC.199 And as of March 5, 2022, there have been over 79 million
cases of COVID-19 in the United States reported to the CDC,200 and
some of these patients have certainly received a therapeutic
countermeasure.
The number of claims that will be eligible for compensation from
the CICP cannot be predicted, but thousands are already under re196. The total number of individuals who received the H1N1 vaccine is somewhat unclear,
with different sources reporting different numbers. Compare Final Estimates for 2009–10 Seasonable Influenza and Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccination Coverage – United States,
August 2009 through May, 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 13, 2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage_0910estimates.htm (reporting 80.8 million persons
over the age of six months received the H1N1 vaccine), with Tom Hals, Americans Seek Compensation for Failed COVID-19 Treatments from U.S. Fund, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2021, 5:04 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-compensation/americans-seek-compensation-for-failed-covid-19-treatments-from-u-s-fund-idUSKBN2B31DH (stating that 123 million people received the H1N1 vaccine).
197. COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2022), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-total-adminrate-total.
198. COVID-19 Vaccines for Children and Teens, supra note 147.
199. United States COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Laboratory Testing (NAATs) by State, Territory, and Jurisdiction, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 5, 2022), https://
covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days (under “view,” select “tests
performed”).
200. Id. (under “view,” select “cases”).
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view and at least some will likely be eligible for compensation. The
system and the Countermeasures Fund itself may be quickly
overburdened, unable to review such a volume of requests in a timely
manner and unable to compensate eligible claims adequately. The
CICP’s funding mechanism must therefore be improved. Even though
Congress appropriated funds to various COVID-19 efforts and authorized the transfer of funds to the Countermeasures Fund,201 it remains unclear whether any of the appropriated funds have been or
will be transferred or how much money is in the Countermeasures
Fund at this time.
The CICP needs a consistent and guaranteed source of funding
prior to and/or upon the declaration of a public health emergency.202
There are a few different ways to achieve this objective, alone or in
combination:
• Mandatory Appropriations: Amendments to the PREP Act
could require that appropriations be made to the Countermeasures Fund with every PREP Act declaration. The amount of
the appropriation could depend, in part, on the total funds in the
Countermeasures Fund at that time, the potential breadth and
length of the applicable public health emergency, and the scope
of the applicable PREP Act declaration (e.g., the number of
countermeasures, persons, and activities covered). If the scope
of a PREP Act declaration expands, such as through amendments to add other covered countermeasures, additional appropriations would need to be considered. Mandatory
appropriations will ensure the Countermeasures Fund receives
funding with every PREP Act declaration, unlike the current situation with COVID-19, in which funds have been appropriated
that merely “may be” transferred to the Countermeasures
Fund.203
• Excise Tax: Like the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust
Fund,204 the Countermeasures Fund could be funded by an excise tax on each dose or unit of a covered countermeasure. But
unlike the excise tax imposed on vaccines, which requires Con201. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
202. An ongoing, consistent source of funding is important because “[i]f a pandemic strikes
and Congress were in a budget crisis, or merely underestimated the amount of funding the
[CICP] would require,” injured individuals “would be left ‘high and dry’ without recourse.” Copper, supra note 14, at 92.
203. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat.
281, 560–61 (2020); Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2020, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146, 149 (2020).
204. About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 155.
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gress to pass legislation for each vaccine before it can be covered
under the VICP (which can be a lengthy process), the excise tax
should apply automatically once the product is deemed a covered countermeasure.205 Because countermeasures are frequently (and at times exclusively) purchased by the government,
it would be necessary to ensure that government contracts cannot carve out this excise tax.206
• User Fees: Various “user fee” acts provide the FDA with the
authority to collect fees from companies that produce certain
products.207 With respect to drugs and vaccines, the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act was passed by Congress in 1992 and authorizes the FDA to collect fees from entities that submit a human
drug application to the FDA.208 A human drug application is
defined as “an application for—(A) approval of a new drug submitted under section 355(b) of [Title 21 of the U.S. Code, the
FDCA], or (B) licensure of a biological product under subsection (a) of section 262 of [Title 42 of the U.S. Code, the
PHSA].”209 This definition does not include applications for an
EUA, which are submitted pursuant to section 564 of the
FDCA.210 Thus, the user fee provisions of the FDCA could be
amended to authorize the FDA to collect fees from EUA applicants.211 A few reasons make this funding approach less ideal
than others. It would likely require amendments to various pro205. See 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (1997); id. § 4132 (listing “taxable vaccines”). Proposals have been
made to amend the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code so that the excise tax is
automatically imposed on vaccines that are added to the Vaccine Injury Table. See, e.g., Vaccine
Access Improvement Act of 2021, H.R. 3656, 117th Cong. (2021); Vaccine Access Improvement
Act of 2019, H.R. 1973, 116th Cong. (2019).
206. Given that the federal government purchases other vaccines for which it would pay an
excise tax under the VICP, such as childhood vaccines and the seasonal flu vaccine, it should not
be an issue to impose an excise tax on countermeasure vaccines and other products purchased by
the government. See Meyers, supra note 132, at 10. If for any reason an excise tax would not be
feasible, then an analogous mechanism could be used. For example, for each purchase of a particular countermeasure, a specific percentage of the purchase price could be required to be allocated to the Countermeasures Fund.
207. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2017) (authorizing user fees for certain drugs and biologics
(including vaccines)); id. § 379j (authorizing user fees for certain medical devices); id. § 379j-42
(authorizing user fees for certain human generic drugs).
208. Id. § 379h.
209. Id. § 379g(1).
210. Id. § 360bbb-3.
211. Because companies that receive EUAs are expected to continue to pursue full approval/
licensure, which would subject them to the typical user fees for human drug applications, the
user fees assessed on such companies at the time they file an application for full approval could
take into consideration the amount already paid by such companies when they filed an EUA
application.
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visions of the FDCA212 and may face opposition by companies
that may be subject to these user fees. It may also discourage
smaller biopharmaceutical companies from exploring potentially
beneficial countermeasures prior to or during a public health
emergency.213 Further, user fees could have the unintended consequence of causing companies to increase the prices of their
EUA products, which some companies made available on a notfor-profit basis during the pandemic.214
2. Accessibility and Equitability
The compensation program must also be fair, transparent, and accessible to all individuals who believe they were injured by a covered
countermeasure. Claimants may benefit from the assistance of an attorney when navigating the complicated system and filing a request.
Attorneys’ fees, therefore, should be eligible for reimbursement, regardless of whether other compensation is awarded, for requests made
in good faith and with a reasonable basis for the claim(s) brought.215
Without reimbursement for attorneys’ fees, individuals—particularly
lower-income individuals—(1) may try to navigate the system without
the benefit of an attorney, thus reducing their likelihood of success;
(2) may not seek compensation at all; or (3) will face additional financial hardship by paying out-of-pocket for an attorney. Medical bills
from a countermeasure-related injury already have a greater impact
on low-income individuals, and the process to obtain compensation
212. For example, the Secretary can grant a waiver or reduction of user fees if the “waiver or
reduction is necessary to protect the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 379h(d)(1)(A). An EUA applicant could typically make this argument. Further guidance and clarity would be needed as to
how this provision would apply to EUA applicants if the law was amended to require user fees
for EUA applicants.
213. This risk is mitigated by the fact that (1) an applicant can seek a waiver or reduction of
the fees if the fees “would present a significant barrier to innovation because of limited resources
available to such person or other circumstances” and (2) the Secretary must consider the assets
of the applicant when determining whether to grant a waiver or reduction of fees. 21 U.S.C.
§ 379h(d)(1)(B), (2).
214. See Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 Vaccine Authorized by U.S. FDA For Emergency Use – First Single-Shot Vaccine in Fight Against Global Pandemic (Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-covid-19-vaccine-authorized-by-u-sfda-for-emergency-usefirst-single-shot-vaccine-in-fight-against-global-pandemic (stating that
Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine would be “available on not-for-profit basis for emergency pandemic use”).
215. Under the VICP, even when a claim is otherwise not eligible for compensation, compensation may be awarded to cover reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in the proceedings “if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith
and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-15(e)(1).
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should not impose additional burdens or unnecessary barriers to those
most in need of compensation.
Considering the emphasis on ensuring equitable distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines and concerns about the disparate impact of the
pandemic on low-income populations and people of color, a compensation program that is not equally accessible to all represents a tremendous oversight and exacerbates these disparities.216 Furthermore,
a compensation program structured in a way that makes it less accessible to certain populations could increase vaccine hesitancy among
those populations, as it could suggest they are less worthy of receiving
compensation for their injuries. Given the disparate impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on low-income populations and people of color,
society must “provide strong safety nets and supports,” including adequate injury compensation, to ensure that people feel comfortable using COVID-19 countermeasures.217 People should not hesitate to use
covered countermeasures when needed because they fear they will be
left without recourse for injuries that could occur after using a
countermeasure.218
In addition to payment of attorneys’ fees, pain and suffering should
be eligible for compensation. Furthermore, because inappropriately
low recovery caps are “bound to be least generous to the most devastatingly disabled,” the caps on compensation must be reassessed and
adjusted periodically for inflation.219

216. See, e.g., Carlos Irwin A. Oronce et al., Association Between State-Level Income Inequality and COVID-19 Cases and Mortality in the USA, 35 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2791, 2791
(2020) (finding that states with the highest level of income inequality had a larger number of
COVID-19-related deaths compared to states with lower income inequality); Caroline Kelly et
al., Low-Income COVID-19 Patients Die Needlessly Because They Are Stuck in the Wrong Hospitals—While the Right Hospitals Too Often Shut Them Out, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 2, 2021), https:/
/www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210401.95800/full/ (“[L]ow-income COVID-19 patients continue to face barriers in accessing life-saving care . . . . Under our current health care
system, the COVID-19 patients most likely to be treated at underresourced hospitals are often
Medicaid recipients or uninsured, and many are people of color.”).
217. See Van Tassel et al., supra note 189, at e34(2).
218. Prior experience suggests that concerns about compensation can impact one’s willingness
to use a countermeasure. For example, a survey of healthcare workers asked to volunteer for a
smallpox vaccination found that 49% of workers who declined the vaccine believed their chances
of being compensated were low or very low, compared to 23% of those who agreed to be vaccinated. Pascale M. Wortley et al., Predictors of Smallpox Vaccination Among Healthcare Workers
and Other First Responders, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 538, 539 (2007).
219. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administration Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 976 (1993).
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3. Statute of Limitations
The CICP requires a request to be submitted within one year of the
date of the administration or use of the covered countermeasure alleged to have caused the injury.220 Unlike the VICP, it does not provide for filing in relation to the date of death or date of the onset of
the injury or symptoms. Even though long-term health problems are
“extremely unusual” following any vaccination,221 a one-year statute
of limitations from the date of the use or administration of the covered countermeasure is far too short. Furthermore, therapeutic countermeasures may have long-term side effects that have yet to be
discovered.222 It takes time to determine whether an injury might be
related to a covered countermeasure and thus eligible for compensation, and it also takes time to gather the information needed to file a
claim with the CICP. At a minimum, the statute of limitations should
be lengthened to mirror the limitations period of the VICP.
4. Transparency
The CICP’s lack of transparency is problematic and needs to be addressed. First, requesters should have the opportunity to be more involved in the process after they file their requests. Like the VICP,
there should be an opportunity for a hearing before an independent
adjudicator (e.g., a special master) during which both parties can present evidence. Decisions should not be made behind closed doors.
Currently, decisions can be at the sole discretion of the Secretary because the Secretary “may,” but is not required to, obtain the opinions
of qualified medical experts in making determinations concerning covered injuries.223
Importantly, decisions must be made public. Publishing the decisions will help inform potential requesters of the types of injuries that
may be eligible for compensation and the types of information and
evidence needed to be deemed eligible for compensation. Not only
220. 42 C.F.R. § 110.42(a).
221. Safety of COVID-19 Vaccines, supra note 169.
222. For example, an analysis of all 222 novel therapeutics approved by the FDA between
January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2010, and monitored through February 28, 2017, found that
the median time from approval to first “postmarket safety event” was 4.2 years, and the proportion of the drugs affected by a postmarket safety event at 10 years was 30.8%. See Nicholas S.
Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US Food
and Drug Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1854, 1854 (2017). This
analysis looked at three types of postmarket safety events: (1) withdrawals due to safety concerns; (2) FDA issuance of boxed warnings to the product label after initial approval; and
(3) FDA issuance of safety communications. Id. at 1856.
223. 42 C.F.R. § 110.20(a).
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will this make the process more transparent, but it may also make the
process more efficient and fair by preventing inconsistent or unsupported decisions224 and discouraging individuals from filing unsupported claims.
Greater transparency can also help combat skepticism. It will allow
individuals to better understand the potential risks of a countermeasure and provide confidence that recourse may be available if they are
injured. Without greater transparency, “[t]he CICP ‘is the perfect target’” for vaccine opponents and others who believe that unsafe countermeasures are being “foisted upon a vulnerable public.”225 As noted
by Professor Peter Meyers, “an open and more forthcoming perspective” could help counteract the hesitancy some Americans feel about
COVID-19 vaccines and other countermeasures.226
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the HRSA has made some
progress toward greater transparency. Previously, very little information except the total number of claims filed, denied, and compensated
was available to the public. The HRSA now provides additional details by listing the alleged injury and the category of the alleged countermeasure for filed claims.227 Furthermore, for compensated claims,
the HRSA now provides the compensation amount per claim.228 To
increase transparency further, the HRSA should list the total amount
of money currently available in the Countermeasures Fund. An additional data point that may be helpful to put the injuries in context
would be to include the total number of each type of countermeasure
used in the United States as of the date of the report (e.g., “Of [x]
224. For example, making the decisions public could help counteract a concern about compensation programs noted by Professor Robert L. Rabin: that those making decisions “might
exhibit undue conservatism in the face of a staggering volume of claims,” which would result in
inadequate compensation being provided to victims. Rabin, supra note 219, at 975–76.
225. Meyers, supra note 132, at 2 (quoting Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Popularism and the
Role of Law in the H1N1 Vaccine Campaign, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 113, 146
(2010)). Liability protections for vaccine manufacturers have been cited as one of the legal structures that leads to vaccine hesitancy and skepticism. See Eugene McCarthy, The Regulatory Production of Vaccine Hesitancy, 86 BROOK. L. REV. 81, 83 (2020).
226. Rebecca Lindstrom & Lindsey Basye, A First Look at Injury Claims Associated with
COVID-19 Treatments. On the List, Attempted Murder, 11ALIVE (Apr. 22, 2021, 4:51 PM),
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/the-reveal/covid-vaccine-injury-claims-investigated/85-8ca25ede-ac31-4192-ade3-e05711844b0b; see also Hals, supra note 196 (“It’s important
to have openness to gain the trust of the American public and to counter the vaccine hesitancy.”
(quoting Meyers)).
227. The HRSA does not list the specific manufacturer. Requesters must identify the alleged
countermeasure generally, but they are not required to list the specific manufacturer or trade
name on their claim. See Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data, supra
note 134.
228. Table 2, supra note 138.
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doses of the COVID-19 vaccine administered in the United States, [y]
claims have been filed seeking compensation for injury or death”).
Absent these and other changes, the CICP will remain an inadequate solution for those potentially injured by covered countermeasures. The unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic
makes it imperative to revisit and reform the CICP to ensure it is a
fair, accessible, and transparent process.
CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic ushered in an era during which the expeditious research and development of safe and effective countermeasures were more important than ever before. The liability protections
provided by the PREP Act helped make this happen. This Article
builds from the premise that the PREP Act’s liability protections are
important and should be retained. That said, liability protections must
go hand-in-hand with a robust no-fault compensation program. One
need not come at the expense of the other, and a no-fault compensation program must not be a mere afterthought. This Article unpacked
the inadequate and enigmatic no-fault CICP currently available to individuals injured by COVID-19 countermeasures and proposed possible reforms. Given the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
hundreds of millions of individuals who have used and will use
COVID-19 countermeasures, the time is now to reform a relatively
unknown and inadequate compensation program to ensure it is adequate, fair, and accessible to all.
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